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1
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to clarify some issues concerning the core as a solution concept for
games in coalitional form, as well as the representation of these games by economies of a certain
formal type. Our main interest is in games with side-payments in coalitional form. However,
we shall imbed their study in the more general theory of games without side-payments.
It is well known that some games with side-payments may have an empty core. Following
Shapley and Shubik [9] one associates to such a game its totally balanced cover, which is a
game of the same type having a nonempty core. On the other hand, one may also look at the
original side-payment game from a geometrical point of view and consider it as some particular
(hyperplane) game without side-payments. This in turn allows one to use the notion of totally
balanced cover of a game without side-payments as introduced by Billera and Bixby [4]. Hence
one is actually lead to contrast two types of “covering” for a side-payment game: namely the
totally balanced cover of its geometrical representation as a game without side-payments – we
call it the envelope – and the geometrical no-side-payment representation of its totally balanced
side-payment cover, called the geometrical cover (§1). Although these two no-side-payment
totally balanced games associated to the same side-payment game may differ, their cores always
coincide (§2).
There is an “economic interpretation” for such a discrepancy. We consider a modification of
the notion of “direct market” of Shapley-Shubik [9] that we call “restricted direct market”. We
show that the envelope of a side-payment game is the game without side-payments associated
to a restricted market, while the geometrical cover is associated to a direct market (§3). The
essential difference between these two markets is whether or not a player can obtain utility from
a coalition without being a member. Finally (in §4), we compare this new type of market (which
is still a pure exchange economy) to the production representation of Billera [3]. In fact we show
that an “input net trade equivalent” of this production representation is the same (up to a trivial
identification) as the Rader net trade equivalent of the restricted direct market (see [6]).
2
1 A no-side-payment viewpoint to games with side-payments
In this section we give the basic definitions and notation. For a set N = {1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , n} of
“players” we consider games with side-payments in coalitional form as real-valued functions v
defined on P (N), the set of all nonempty subsets of N , called “coalitions”. To simplify and unify
their economic representation we shall consider only 0-normalized games, i.e. games v such that
∀ i ∈ N, v({i}) = 0, and impose the weak monotonicity condition that: ∀S ∈ P (N), v(S) ≥ 0.
For any game v the core of v is the set
Core(v)
def
= {u ∈ RN ; 〈u; 1IN 〉 = v(N),∀S ∈ P (N), 〈u, 1IS〉 ≥ v(S)}
where 1IS ∈ {0, 1}
N is the characteristic function1 of S ∈ P (N). This can be interpreted as the
set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition which cannot be objected against by other
coalitions.
Define for T ∈ P (N), the set BT of balanced families of coefficients on T by:
BT
def
=

β ∈ RP (T )+ ;
∑
S∈P (T )
β(S)1IS = 1IT

 . (1.1)
To a game v, we associate, as in Shapley-Shubik [9], the game v, called the totally balanced cover
of v which is:
v(T )
def
= sup
γ∈BT
∑
S∈P (T )
γ(S)v(S), T ∈ P (N). (1.2)
The game v is said to be balanced if and only if v(N) = v(N), and totally balanced if and only
if v = v.
Define the sets A
def
= {u ∈ RN ;∀S ∈ P (N), 〈u, 1IS〉 ≥ v(S)}, and B
def
= {u ∈ RN ;∀S ∈
P (N), 〈u, 1IS〉 ≥ v(S)}. We have A = B. The result follows from the inequality v ≥ v (see (1.2))
and from the fact that for each T ∈ P (N) and δ ∈ BT such that v(T ) =
∑
S∈P (T ) δ(S)v(S),
we clearly have (see (1.1)): 〈u, 1IT 〉 =
∑
S∈P (T ) δ(S)〈u, 1IS〉. Consider now the two following
1For any S ∈ P (N), we have 1IS(i) = 1, if i ∈ S, and 1IS(i) = 0 otherwise. Vectors in R
N are called “payoff
vectors” and 〈u, 1IS〉 =
P
i∈S ui may be interpreted as the “total amount obtained by the coalition” S.
3
programs:
min
u∈A
〈u, 1IN 〉 and (1.3)
min
u∈B
〈u, 1IN 〉. (1.4)
By looking at the dual of (1.3), one finds that each optimal solution u of (1.3) fulfills 〈u, 1IN 〉 =
v(N). Therefore the optimal solutions of (1.4), as well as the optimal solutions of (1.3), are
exactly the elements2 of Core(v). Moreover, we have Core(v) 6= ∅ if and only if v is balanced,
which is the well-known Bondareva-Shapley Theorem (see [8]).
A more general class of games in coalitional form for a set N of players is the class of games
without side-payments. Let RS
def
= {u ∈ RN ;∀ i /∈ S, ui = 0} and R
S
+
def
= {u ∈ RS ;∀ i ∈ S, ui ≥
0}. A game without side-payments is a correspondence V from P (N) to RN such that, for each
S ∈ P (N), V (S) is nonempty, comprehensive (i.e. V (S) = V (S)−RS+) and, for each a
S ∈ V (S),
V (S) ∩ ({aS} + RS+) is compact. In connection to the market representation of games without
side-payments we shall only consider games which are compactly generated3 namely games V
such that, ∀S ∈ P (N), V (S) = CS − R
S
+, where CS is a nonempty compact subset of R
S .
The Core of a game V without side-payments is the set:
Core(V )
def
= {u ∈ V (N) : ∀S ∈ P (N), 6 ∃u′ ∈ V (S) | ∀ i ∈ S, u′i > ui}.
Billera [3] defines (see his definition (3.1))4 the totally balanced cover V of a game without
side-payments V by:
V (T )
def
=
⋃
δ∈BT
∑
S∈P (T )
δ(S)V (S), T ∈ P (N). (1.5)
A game V is said to be totally balanced if and only if V = V . Such a game has a nonempty core
(see [7]).
2To each game v, one may associate the game v∗, called the balanced cover of v and defined by: v∗(N) = v(N),
and ∀S 6= N , v∗(S) = v(S). Clearly by the same argument we have Core(v∗) = Core(v).
3This terminology is due to Billera [3].
4The notion was also discussed in Baudier [2] and originally used by Scarf in the prepublication version of
[7]. As mentioned in Billera and Bixby [4] it is stronger than the notion of Scarf [7], which makes no use of the
summation operator. Since we will be dealing exclusively with games without side-payments derived from games
with side-payments, it seems that most objections against using such an operator vanish.
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We define the geometrical representation of a game with side-payments v as the game without
side-payments H+(v) given by
5
H+(v)(T )
def
= {u ∈ RT+; 〈u, 1IT 〉 ≤ v(T )} − R
T
+, T ∈ P (N). (1.6)
For any side-payment game v, the totally balanced cover H+(v)
def
= H+(v) of the geomet-
rical representation H+(v) of v is called, for short, the envelope of v. On the other hand, the
geometrical representation H+(v) of the totally balanced cover v of v is called, for short, the
geometrical cover of v. It is quite natural to compare, for a given game with side-payments v,
the two alternative ways to compose the geometrical representation operator with the totally
balanced cover operator, giving respectively H+(v) and H+(v). We first have:
for each game v, H+(v) ⊂ H+(v). (1.7)
This first result follows from two easy observations, namely: H+(v) ⊂ H+(v) and H+(v) =
H+(v).
2 Envelopes and geometrical covers of side-payment games: a
comparison
The purpose of this section is to push further the comparison between the two different types
of games without side-payments having a nonempty core – envelopes and geometrical covers –
which we have associated to games with side-payments. The first result demonstrates that for
any side-payment game v, satisfying an additional monotonicity condition but being not totally
balanced, the envelope H+(v) effectively differs from the geometrical cover H+(v).
5An alternative representation of v is its hyperplane representation defined by
H(v)(S) = {u ∈ RS ; 〈u, 1IS〉 ≤ v(S)}, S ∈ P (N).
This definition results in a game without side-payments but is not compactly generated.
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Theorem 2.1
6 For a game with side-payments v, if, for some T ⊂ N , supS∈P (T ) v(S) =
v(T ) < v(T ) then H+(v)(T )
⊂
6=H+(v)(T ).
Proof. It is enough to prove the result for T = N . We already know (see (1.7)) thatH+(v)(N) ⊂
H+(v)(N). Take a payoff vector v(N)1I{i} which clearly belongs to H+(v)(N). Assume
supS∈P (N) v(S) = v(N) < v(N): we have v(N)1I{i} /∈ H+(v)(N). Otherwise we could find
δ ∈ BN and x
S ∈ H+(v)(S) ∩ R
S
+, S ∈ P (N), such that:
v(N) =
∑
δ(S)>0
S∋i
δ(S)xSi ≤
∑
δ(S)>0
S∋i
δ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N).
This is a contradiction.
Although Theorem (2.1) requires a monotonicity assumption, it shows that the geometrical
cover and the envelope are different for a very large class of games with side-payments. On the
other hand, we shall now prove that the core concept does not discriminate between geometrical
covers and envelopes.
Theorem 2.2
7 Core(H+(v)) = Core(H+(v)) = Core(v).
Proof.
1. For each u ∈ Rn and γ ∈ BN , we have u =
∑
S∈P (N) γ(S)u
S , (where uS is the projection
of u on RS). If we assume that u ∈ Core(H+(v)), and v(N) =
∑
S∈P (N) γ(S)v(S), we find
that u is an optimal solution of the problems (1.4) and (1.3), while γ is an optimal solution
of the dual of (1.3). Therefore, whenever γ(S) > 0, we have 〈uS , 1IS〉 = v(S), which means
that u =
∑
S∈P (N) γ(S)u
S is a feasible payoff vector in the game H+(v). Moreover, for any
T ⊂ N , the inequality 〈u, 1IT 〉 ≥ v(T ) implies that, for any x ∈ H+(v)(T ) ⊂ H+(v)(T ),
one cannot have: ∀ i ∈ T, xi > ui. Hence Core(H+(v)) ⊂ Core(H+(v)).
6An analogous result holds for hyperplane representations. Formally, if v satisfies supS∈P (T ) v(S) = v(T ) <
v(T ), for some T ⊂ N , then H(v)(t)⊂
6=
H(v)(T ).
7Here also an analogous result holds for hyperplane representations: Core(H(v)) = Core(H(v)) = Core(v).
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2. Conversely, we suppose u ∈ Core(H+(v)). We already know that u ∈ H+(v)(N) and so
〈u, 1IN 〉 ≤ v(N). If, for some T , we had 〈u, 1IT 〉 < v(T ), the vector: x = v(T )u
T /〈u, 1IT 〉
(or v(T )1IT /|T | if 〈u, 1IT 〉 = 0) would be feasible in H+(v)(T ). Moreover, we would have:
∀ i ∈ T, xi > ui. This is a contradiction. Therefore, u is an optimal solution of the program
(1.3), hence of (1.4): u ∈ Core H+(v).
From this second result we see that, as far as the Core solution concept is concerned, envelopes
and geometrical covers cannot be differentiated. To enhance this difference we shall now compare
them from another point of view, the one provided by market games representations.
3 Envelopes of side-payment games and their restricted market
representations
Since Shapley and Shubik [9], the literature on market games has provided various represen-
tations of totally balanced games, with or without side-payments, as “market games” – games
that are derived from some type of economy.
In the preceding sections we associated to any game v two different totally balanced games
without side-payments, namely the geometrical cover H+(v) and the envelope H+(v). We shall
look in this section for two simple types of economies from which these two totally balanced
games can be respectively derived. These must be in general distinct (Theorem 2.1), but should
be as related as possible (Theorem 2.2), in order to capture the nature of the discrepancy between
H+(v) and H+(v). The direct markets in the sense of Shapley and Shubik [9] and a modification
of them, the restricted direct markets, will provide the desired result.
Let us first recall some notions about market games. An n-agent,m-commodity simple market
is an exchange economy of a special kind denoted: E = {(Zi, wi, U i); i ∈ N}, where each agent
i ∈ N has a consumption set Zi = [0, 1]m, a continuous, concave, monotone increasing utility
function U i : [0, 1]m → R+, and initial endowments w
i ∈ [0, 1]m, with
∑
i∈N w
i ≤ (1, 1, · · · , 1).
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The set of feasible allocations8 for a coalition S ∈ P (N) is
ZS
def
=
{
zS = (zi)i∈S ; z
i ∈ Zi,
∑
i∈S
zi =
∑
i∈S
wi
}
.
The associated market game with side-payments is denoted vE and defined by:
vE(S)
def
= sup
zS∈Zs
∑
i∈S
U i(zi), S ∈ P (N). (3.1)
Since the utility functions U i are nonnegative, the game vE is nonnegative valued. One may also
associate to the simple market E a game without side-payments which will be denoted VE:
VE(S)
def
= {u ∈ RS+;∃ z
S ∈ ZS | ∀ i ∈ S,U i(zi) ≥ ui}, S ∈ P (N). (3.2)
In the case where all U i are equal to the same concave positively homogeneous of degree 1
utility function U , Shapley and Shubik [9, (3.3)] prove9 that vE(S) = U(1IS). Since VE(S) ∩R
S
+
is convex, contained in H+(vE)(S) and contains all vectors U(1IS)1I{i} = vE(S)1I{i}, we have:
VE = H+(vE). (3.3)
Define now for τ ∈ [0, 1]N the set Bτ
def
= {β ∈ R
P (N)
+ ;
∑
S∈P (N) β(S)1IS = τ}. Following
Shapley and Shubik [9] associate to a game with side-payments v an n-agent, m-commodity
simple market, called the direct market generated by v, which we denote Dv:
Dv = {(Z
i, wi, U)i ∈ N}, (3.4)
8The justification for using an equality constraint for feasibility comes from the assumption that the utility
functions are monotone increasing. In Shapley and Shubik [9] the utility functions are only assumed to be
continuous and concave real-valued functions. Hence in some cases the equality constraint for feasibility (which
is needed for their results) seems to be less justified from an economic viewpoint.
9Because of the equality constraint in the feasible set the only assumptions needed are the ones stated. However
see the discussion in footnote 8.
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where, for every i ∈ N , Zi = [0, 1]N , wi = 1I{i}, and
10
U(τ) = sup
γ∈Bτ
∑
S∈P (N)
γ(S)v(S).
Shapley and Shubik [9] show that, for any side-payment game v,
vDv = v (3.5)
and that for a totally balanced game v : v = vDv .
Looking at the direct market Dv from a non-side-payment point of view, and combining (3.3)
and (3.5), we get:
VDv = H+(v). (3.6)
Hence, from a non-side payment point of view, the direct market does provide us with a repre-
sentation of the geometrical cover.
To obtain a representation of the envelopeH+(v), let us reconsider the classical interpretation
of goods and utilities in Dv. In a direct market, each individual initial endowment w
i = 1I{i}
may be interpreted as the “total available time of agent i”. Given any allocation (τ1, · · · , τn)
feasible for the grand coalition, that is, for every i ∈ N , τ i ∈ [0, 1]N and
∑
i∈N τ
i = 1IN , we may
also interpret every τ ij as the “amount of time agent j is at the disposal of agent i”. Finally,
considering some γi ∈ Bτ i , γ
i(S) may be interpreted as the “time coalition S meets for agent i”
and γi(S)v(S) as the return which agent i receives in the game v for the assembly of S. Thus,
the utility of agent i, which is given by
U(τ i) =
∑
S∈P (N)
γi(S)v(S), for some γi ∈ Bτ i ,
measures the “total return” obtained by player i in the game, assuming that he is allowed to
benefit also from meetings in which he does not participate.
10This function U is positively homogeneous of degree one and super-additive (hence concave) on [0, 1]N . A
separation theorem ensures that the super-differential ∂(U)(1IN ) of U , extended to R
N
+ and taken as 1IN , is
nonempty. With B1IS being identified to BS , the restriction of U to {0, 1}
N is v and we have ∂(U)(1IN ) =
Core(v). See Aubin [1].
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Let us now assume that the meeting programs for agent i are restricted only to those assem-
blies (coalitions) of which he is a member, i.e. {S ∈ P (N); i ∈ S}. This restriction will prove to
be sufficient to get a market representation of H+(v). We call restricted direct market associated
to the game v the n-agent, n-good simple market denoted Rv and defined as:
Rv = {(Z
i, wi, U i); i ∈ N} (3.7)
where, for every i ∈ N , Zi = [0, 1]N , wi = 1I{i},
U i(τ) = sup
γ∈Bτ

 ∑
S∈P (N)
S∋i
γ(S)v(S)

 .
Since v ≥ 0, we note that U ≥ U i, for every i ∈ N .
As wished, the economy Rv is very similar to Dv, while providing a representation of H+(v).
Theorem 3.3 The game without side-payments VRv , associated to the restricted direct market
of the game v, is the envelope H+(v) of v.
Proof.
1. Consider, for some T ∈ P (N), some x ∈ H+(v)(T ) ∩ R
T
+. We have x =
∑
S∈P (T ) γ(S)x
S ,
with γ ∈ BT and x
S ∈ H+(v)(S) (or 〈x
S , 1IS〉 ≤ v(S)). Letting x
S = v(S)1IS/|S| if x
S = 0
and xS = v(S)xS/〈xS , 1IS〉 otherwise, it is easy to see that x ≤ x
def
=
∑
S∈P (T ) γ(S)x
S .
Let us then define, for i ∈ T , γi(S) ≥ 0 by:
γi(S) = 0 if i /∈ S,
γi(S) = 1
|S|
γ(S) if i ∈ S and v(S) = 0,
γi(S) =
γ(S)
v(S)
xSi if i ∈ S and v(S) 6= 0.
Then, for each S,
∑
i∈S γ
i(S) = γ(S), and for each j ∈ T ,
∑
S⊂T ;S∋j(
∑
i∈S γ
i(S)) = 1
since γ ∈ BT .
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Defining also τ i =
∑
S⊂T γ
i(S)1IS for i ∈ T , we find that
∑
i∈T
τ i =
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊂T
γi(S)1IS
=
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
γi(S)
∑
j∈S
1I{j}
=
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈T
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
S∋j
γi(S)1I{j}
=
∑
j∈T
1I{j}
∑
i∈T
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
S∋j
γi(S)
=
∑
j∈T
1I{j}
∑
S⊂T
S∋j
∑
i∈S
γi(S)
= 1IT
which means that (τ i)i∈T is an allocation in the restriction of T of Rv. The decomposition
defining τ i shows that:
U i(τ i) ≥
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
γi(S)v(S) =
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
v(S)>0
γi(S)v(S)
while:
xi =
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
γ(S)xSi =
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
v(S)>0
γ(S)xSi =
∑
S⊂T
S∋i
v(S)>0
γi(S)v(S).
We have proved that xi ≤ xi ≤ U
i(τ i), i ∈ T , that is H+(v)(T ) ⊂ VRv(T ), for each
T ∈ P (N).
2. To prove the inclusion VRv ⊂ H+(v), it is sufficient to prove, for each decomposition
1IT =
∑
i∈T τ
i, τ i ∈ [0, 1]n, and each decomposition τ i =
∑
S⊂T γ
i(S)1IS , that the vector u
of all ui =
∑
S∋i γ
i(S)v(S), for i ∈ T , ui = 0 for i /∈ T , is equal to or dominated by some
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vector of H+(v)(T ). For S ⊂ T we define x
S as 0 if
∑
k∈T γ
k(S) = 0, and otherwise by:
xSi = 0 for i /∈ S,
xSi =
γi(S)v(S)∑
k∈T
γk(S)
for i ∈ S.
We find that xS = (xSi )i belongs to H+(v)(S). Then, defining γ(S)
def
=
∑
k∈T γ
k(S), we
find that γ ∈ BT ,
u =
∑
S⊂T
γ(S)>0
∑
i∈S
γi(S)v(S)1I{i} =
∑
S⊂T
γ(S)xS ∈ H+(v)(T ).
Hence Theorem 3.3 establishes, for a game with side-payments v, the same relationship be-
tween the restricted direct market Rv and the envelope H+(v) as the one that can be established
(from Shapley and Shubik [9]) between the direct market Dv and the geometrical cover H+(v).
Finally, the analogy can be pushed a step further and the relationship between the core of the
game H+(v) and the competitive payoff in the restricted market Rv can be examined. There is,
for the restricted direct market Rv, a result similar to Theorem 1 in Shapley-Shubik [10] which
states: “every payoff vector in the Core of a totally balanced game is competitive in the direct
market of that game”. To be more precise, given a Core allocation τ = (τ1, · · · , τ2, · · · , τn) in
the economy Rv, define p = (u
i(τ i))i∈N ∈ R
N
+ ; it may be verified that the Core allocation τ is
competitive both in Rv and in Dv with respect to the “price vector” p. Since p ∈ CoreH+(v),
we must have 〈p, 1IS〉 ≥ v(S), for each S ⊂ N . For each t ∈ [0, 1]
N and each decomposition
τ =
∑
S∈P (N) γ(S)1IS , we therefore find that 〈p, τ〉 ≥
∑
S∈P (N) γ(S)v(S). That is we get the
inequality 〈p, ·〉 ≥ U(·), between functions on [0, 1]N . The inequalities U ≥ U i, together with the
equality
∑
i∈N 〈p, τ
i〉 = 〈p, 1IN 〉, finally proves that, for every i ∈ N , 〈p, τ
i〉 = U i(τ i) = U(τ i).
As a corollary, we get the inclusion CoreH+(v) ⊂ CoreH+(v) in Theorem 2.2. But, we
also have from part (1) in the proof of Theorem 3.3, that, for each x ∈ CoreH+(v), x is
dominated by some vector (U i(τ i))i∈N (since x ∈ H+(v)(N)). The inequalities U ≥ U
i ensure
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that xi = U
i(τ i) = U(τ i), which proves the inclusion CoreH+(v) ⊂ CoreH+(v). Therefore, an
alternative proof of Theorem 2.2 may be obtained via the representations Dv and Rv of H+(v)
and H+(v).
4 The production representation of the envelope and its net
trade equivalent
We defined in (3.7) the restricted direct market Rv, which was shown to provide a representation
of the envelope H+(v), and an explanation of the discrepancy between the envelope and the
geometrical cover H+(v).
The paper by Billera [3] provides, for a game V without side-payments, a representation of
its totally balanced cover V (see (1.5)) as the market game of some n-agent, 2n-good economy
PV , with production. The author also mentions that by taking the “net trade Rader equivalent”
of PV one obtains an n-agent, 2n-good net trade economy with the same market game, that is
V . In this section we define an input net trade equivalent of PV and prove that, in the special
case of V = H+(v), it is the same as the net trade equivalent of the restricted direct market Rv.
This provides a second view of the envelope H+(v).
Let us start with a general game V , where, for every S ∈ P (N), V (S) = CS −R
S
+, with each
CS a compact convex subset of R
S contained in some cube C = [0,M ]N of RN+ . Notice that
in the special case V = H+(v) we simply let M = supS∈P (N) v(S). We consider the n-agent,
2n-good economy with production denoted11 Pv = {(Z
i
, wi, U
i
, Y i), i ∈ N} which is built as
follows. Agent’s i ∈ N initial endowment is wi = (0, 1I{i}) ∈ R
2n (later on interpreted as “his
time”), his consumption set is Z
i
= C × {0} ⊂ R2n, and his utility U
i
is defined by taking the
projection on the ith factor in R2n, i.e. for zi = (c, 0) ∈ Z
i
, U
i
(zi) = Proji(c, 0) = ci. Every
i ∈ N has also a production possibility set which is the set Y i ⊂ R2n of convex combinations of
2n vectors, namely the vector (0, 0) and the vectors of the form (cS ,−1IS), where fore S ∈ P (N),
11See Billera [3, p. 130].
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cS ∈ CS ⊂ C; that is y
i ∈ Y i if and only if
yi =
∑
S∈P (N)
αiS(c
S ,−1IS),
where, for every S ∈ P (N), αiS ≥ 0,
∑
S∈P (n) α
i
S ≤ 1, and c
S ∈ CS ⊂ C. A feasible state of the
economy Pv is a family (y
i, zi)i∈N , with y
i ∈ Y i, zi ∈ Z
i
and
∑
i∈N
(zi − yi) = (0, 1IN ) =
∑
i∈N
wi.
Intuitively speaking we consider the last n goods, the people times, as inputs out of which
agent i can produce the first n goods which are the outputs. Agent i only cares about the ith
good which can be obtained by using time of people in some coalition S such that S ∋ i, i.e.,
to which he belongs. Notice here a striking similarity with the definition of the utility U i in
the restricted market Rv (see (3.7)). The restriction on the α
i
S is related to the fact that in any
case agent i can use at most one unit of time of agent j. We also see that agent i has no initial
endowment of the first n goods (the outputs).
The economy PV generates a game without side-payments VPV in a manner similar to (3.2)
(see Billera [3], p. 131). We have:
VPV (S) =
{
u ∈ RS ,∀ i ∈ S, ui ≤ U
i
(zi), zi ∈ Z
i
∑
i∈S
(zi − wi) ∈
∑
i∈S
Y i
}
, S ∈ P (N).
(4.1)
By the argument of Theorem 3.3 in Billera [3] it can be checked that VPV is the totally balanced
cover V of V . In particular, for V = H+(v), VPH+(v) is the envelope H+(v) and, by (3.8), we
get:
VPH+(v) = H+(v) = VRv . (4.2)
Now, while PH+(v) and R differ essentially, we shall see how they can be compared by
modifying the notion of “net trade equivalent”, introduced in Rader [6], and used by Billera [3]
and Billera-Bixby [5]. For an economy with production PV we may define its input net trade
equivalent as the set
Eq[PV ] = {(Z
i
∗, U
i
∗); i ∈ N},
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where Z
i
∗ is agent i
′s set of admissible net trades, that is Z
i
∗ = {0} × ([0, 1]
N − 1I{i}) and where
U
i
∗, his utility, is defined by letting, for z
i
∗ = (0, t
i) ∈ Z
i
∗,
U
i
∗(z
i
∗) = U
i
∗(0, t
i) = supU
i
(yi + (0, ti) + (0, 1I{i})),
the Sup being taken over the set {yi ∈ Y i; (yi + (0, ti) + (0, 1I{i})) ∈ Z
i
}. To make things clear,
denote by t
ij
k the net amount of good k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n, received by agent i ∈ N from agent j ∈ N
in such an economy. We have by definition:
• t
ij
k = 0 if k = 1, 2, · · · , n, and t
ii
k = 0,
• t
ij
n+h = 0 if h 6= i and h 6= j,
• −1 ≤ t
ij
n+i ≤ 0, with for each i,
∑
j 6=i t
ij
n+i ∈ [−1, 0],
• 0 ≤ t
ij
n+j ≤ 1, with for each i,
∑
j 6=i t
ij
n+j ∈ [0, 1].
Defining t
i
k ∈ R as the total net amount of good k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n, received by agent i from all
other agents, we get:
• t
i
k = 0 for k = 1, 2, · · · , n, t
i
n+i ∈ [−1, 0] and
• t
i
n+j ∈ [0, 1] for i 6= j.
Therefore we see that the net trade vector t
i
= (t
i
1, t
i
2, · · · , t
i
2n) is of the form (0, t
i), where
ti ∈ ([0, 1]N − 1I{i}) is the net trade vector of the last n goods, and the feasibility constraint is
simply
∑
i∈N t
i = 0 (in [6] all goods are traded).
The net trade equivalent Eq[PV ] generates a game without side-payments, analogously to
(3.2) and (4.1), as follows:
VEq[PV ](S) =
{
u ∈ RS : ∀ i ∈ S, ui ≤ U
i
∗(z
i
∗), z
i
∗ ∈ Z
i
∗,
∑
i∈S
zi∗ = 0
}
.
On the other hand, an n-agent m-commodity simple market E = {(Zi, wi, U i), i ∈ N} (as
defined in §3) is clearly a special case of a production economy where for every i ∈ N , Y i = {0}.
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One can therefore consider the net trade Rader equivalent of E. In particular, given a restricted
direct market Rv, one obtains the n-agent net trade Rader equivalent:
Req[Rv] = {(T
i, U i∗), i ∈ N},
where T i, i’s set of admissible net trades, is simply T i = [0, 1]n − 1I{i} and U
i
∗ is defined by
letting, for ti ∈ T i:
U i∗(t
i) = U i(ti + 1I{i}).
It is trivial to check that: VEq[Rv ] = VRv .
Starting from a game with side-payments v, consider the two net trade economies Eq[PH+(v)]
and Req[Rv]. Let ℓ : R
2n → Rn be the projection onto the last n coordinates. We have, for
every i ∈ N , ℓ(Z
i
∗) = T
i, where Z
i
∗ and T
i are i’s admissible set of net trades in Eq[PH+(v)] and
Req[Rv] respectively. The relationship between the net trade equivalent of PH+(v) and the net
trade Rader equivalent of Rv results from the following statement:
Theorem 4.1 For every i ∈ N , and every ti ∈ [0, 1]N − 1I{i}, U
i
∗(0, t
i) = U i∗(t
i).
Proof. Consider any i ∈ N and any ti ∈ [0, 1]N − 1I{i} = T
i. We have (0, ti) = zi∗ ∈ Z
i
∗. Let us
show first: U
i
∗(0, t
i) ≤ U i∗(t
i). Take yi ∈ Y i, (yi + (0, ti) + (0, 1I{i})) ∈ Z
i
such that:
U
i
∗(0, t
i) = U
i
(yi + (0, ti) + (0, 1I{i})).
We have: yi =
∑
S∈P (N) α
i
S(CS ,−1IS), α
i
S ≥ 0,
∑
S∈P (N) α
i
S ≤ 1, and cS ∈ H+(v)(S) ∩ R
S
+. We
find:
yi + (0, ti) + (0, 1I{i}) =

 ∑
S∈P (N)
αiScS , 0

 .
Thus:
U
i
∗(0, t
i) = Projj

 ∑
S∈P (N)
αiScS , 0

 = ∑
S∈P (N)
αiSc
i
S
and ∑
S∈P (N)
αiS1IS = t
i + 1I{i} = τ
i ∈ [0, 1]N .
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Since we have: ∑
S∈P (N)
αiSc
i
S ≤
∑
S∈P (N)
S∋i
αiSv(S),
we conclude:
U
∗
i (0, t
i) ≤ U i∗(t
i) = sup
γ∈B
τi
∑
S∈P (N)
S∋i
γ(S)v(S), τ i = ti + 1I{i}.
Conversely, let τ i = ti + 1I{i} ∈ [0, 1]
N . Given any decomposition
τ i =
∑
S∈P (N)
γ(S)1IS , γS ≥ 0,
such that
U i∗(t
i) = U i(ti + 1I{i}) =
∑
S∈P (N)
S∋i
γ(S)v(S).
Let us define:
• αiS = 0 if S 6∋ i, α
i
S = γS if S ∋ i,
• cS = 0 if S 6∋, cS = v(S)1I{i} if S ∋ i.
Then we get:
U i∗(t
i) = Pri

 ∑
S∈P (N)
αiScS , 0

 .
Let zi = (
∑
S∈P (N) α
i
ScS , 0) ∈ Z
i
and yi =
∑
S∈P (N) α
i
S(cS ,−1IS) ∈ Y
i. We have: zi =
yi + (0, ti) + (0, 1I{i}). Thus, we obtain: U
i
∗(t
i) = U
i
(zi) ≤ U
i
∗(0, t
i).
Finally using 3.1 in Billera-Bixby [5], (4.2) and (4.3) we get
H+(v) = VEq[PH+(v)]
= VRv = VPH+(v) = VReq[PH+(v)]
.
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